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1. Introduction 
The cow-se of European Integration has repeatedly placed the question of the connection 
between cultural, political, and economic integration on the agenda. A great deal of the 
controversies have centred around the problem whether it is feasible to support political 
union by tighter economic and especially monetary union, or whether tighter political 
union is a precondition for the envisaged economic and monetary union. Many political 
practitioners and theorists follow explicitly or implicitly a kind of structuralist argumenta-
tion, according to which politics, economics, and the cultural sphere are mutually 
interdependent and have a tendency to form a congruent unity. 
In these debates, besides much sophisticated theoretical reasoning, rather crude 
historical analogies sometimes seem to playa powerful role. Here the German experiences 
of the 19th century, especially the customs union of 1834 (Zollverein) can be mentioned. 
The sequence 'Zollverein 1834 - foundation of the united German Reich 1871' gave 
powerful support to the idea that successful economic integration paves the way for 
political union. This was a source of delight for pro-European politicians; others, e.g. 
adherents to partisans of unlimited French independence, used the German example of 
1834 to warn against the allegedly dangerous consequences of the Rome treaties .! 
Authors as diverse as the nationalist historian Heinrich v. Treitschke and the socialist 
theorist Friedrich Engels regarded the Zollverein as a prefiguration of the German Reich. 
John Maynard Keynes with his remark of 'Coal and Iron,' as the driving force behind 
German unification may perhaps be mentioned in this context as well . More recently, the 
German monetary integration prior to the founding of the Reich has attracted the interest 
of researchers analyzing the contemporary problems of monetary integration2 
It seems justified to look again upon the process leading to a unified German state 
in 1871, and to study the relationship between the cultural, economic, and political 
systems in this process . 
2. 'Germany' at the End of the Eighteenth Century 
By 1771 Central Europe was consisted of a political conglomerate called the 'Holy 
Roman Empire of the German Nation ' . The Empire, of medieval origin, formally 
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constituted an entity, but in reality, the 314 sovereign territories and 1475 knighthoods 
(Reichsrilterschaflen) were independent. Wars between them were frequent, and so were 
alliances with other European powers against German rivals. 
The two principal powers within the Empire, Austria and Prussia, were heterogene-
ous constructions themselves. Austria united the German- and Czech-speaking 
populations in the southern and southeastern fringe of the Empire, scattered territories in 
southern Germany, and the Austrian Netherlands (now Belgium). Austria ruled 
additionally over large territories, which formally lay outside the Holy Roman Empire 
(mainly Hungary and parts of northern Italy). Prussia occupied the regions around Berlin, 
some territories in western Germany and large provinces east of the border of the Empire. 
The confessional gap dividing Catholics from Protestants ran through the Empire. 
The majority of the inhabitants spoke German dialects, but these dialects were usually not 
inter-communicative. The use of German standard speech was restricted to the thin layer 
of higher bureaucrats, clergymen and Bildungsburger (see below). Latin was still widely 
used in scientific and theological texts, and many aristocrats preferred French. Large 
sections of the population spoke non-German languages, e.g. Polish. 
The economic sphere was equally divided. Historians have counted 1800 customs 
barriers, in Prussia alone there were 67. The export and import of certain goods were in 
many parts strictly forbidden. 3 
But there was one factor working for a closer cultural and linguistic unification: the 
comparatively high level of education. At the end of the eighteenth century, there were 
between 42 and 50 universities in the Holy Roman Empire (the exact number is a question 
of definition). In France, with a larger population, there were 22, and in England only 2. 
As to basic education, already the school statute of Weimar (Weimarer Schulordnung) of 
1619 contains the principle of obligatory education. Wiirttemberg introduced obligatory 
education in 1649, Prussia followed in 1717. Between the theory of obligatory education 
and social reality there was a large gap, but around 1800 perhaps 50 percent of the age 
groups liable to schooling attained some sort of regular teaching. In international 
comparison, this was a high figure: 
The position of the Gernlan states between the great powers of Austria, France, and 
Sweden (later Russia) was shaky. This notion of insecurity stimulated the princes to 
consolidate their power internally. Most successful in this respect were the Elector Dukes 
(later kings) of Brandenburg-Prussia. The basic means for consolidating their power 
internally were the mobilization of financial resources, the organizing of permanent 
armies, the building of administrative bureaucracies, and the strengthening of the loyalties 
of their subjects. In this respect the support of Protestant churches were of great value. 
Especially Prussia established a comparatively efficient bureaucracy. Around 1800, 
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there were in Prussia about 1700 civil servants with a higher qualification and 4-5000 
servants in auxiliaI)' functions. ' Despite its numerical smallness the bureaucracy became 
an influential political factor because its representatives had an unparalleled bulk of 
professional expertise, and they were united by an intense communication links. 
The growing state bureaucracies meant a growing demand for qualified manpower; 
the same was true for the royal domains and the other sectors of the economy. Additional-
ly, the princes had a strong political interest in having their subjects 'properly' socialized 
in schools. Furthermore, Luther and the reformers had placed strong emphasis on reading 
the Bible. Taken together, these factors can explain the growth in educational activities. 
These in turn significantly contributed to the spreading of Luther's German, because, 
besides religious instruction, it was used for other subjects (writing, choir-singing)." 
Gradually, this Luther-based standard speech filtered into the Catholic areas as well in 
spite of some resistance by the Catholic clergy. 7 
The universities of the Protestant areas, especially G6ttingen and Halle, displayed 
a remarkable intellectual vitality. This was partly due to the political fragmentation: 
Almost every prince wanted a university (or several), and every theoretical doctrine, every 
intellectual mode, was represented somewhere. Thus, the political 'polyarchy' created a 
'polyphony' of opinions. 8 Additionally, the idea of religious tolerance was, at least in the 
Protestant parts, well implanted. Reformation had deprived religion of its status of 
Wlquestioned faith, and its more shaky base made it less prone to serve as legitimation for 
repressive actions. Additionally, in many of the German states religious repression would 
have been politically suicidal, given the heterogenous popUlations. In Brandenburg (later 
Prussia), in 1613 the ruling dynasty converted to Calvinism, whereas the majority of the 
population remained Lutheran. Other parts were Catholic. After the expansion of Prussia 
into Polish territory two fifths of the Prussian subjects were Catholics. Not surprisingly, 
the duke electorslkings of Brandenburg-Prussia early developed a policy of religious 
tolerance. This policy strengthened Prussia considerably, when waves of religious 
intolerance swept over the neighbouring cOWltries. Thus, about 20.000 French Huguenots 
found a new home in Brandenburg after 1685: 
All in all, the picture was contradictory: Politically, Central Europe was more 
divided than ever, and the political divisions constituted severe obstacles for the economic 
development. On the other hand, the Protestant regions were characterized by a high 
educational standard, and culturally and linguistically strong unifYing tendencies were 
visible. The agents of this cultural Wlification were first and foremost the Bildungsbiirger, 
people with further education, such as teachers, priests, physicians, booksellers and 
editors, or state officials. They spoke and wrote standard language and communicated 
across the political borders . But the commercial bourgeoisie was still quite small. Unlike 
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England, there was no economically powerful class to support the growing ideas of 
bourgeois emancipation . And as a consequence of the numerous political and economic 
divisions, the educational and commercial bourgeoisie was scattered all over the Empire 
(not concentrated as was the case with Paris in France), and therefore politically weaker 
than their colleagues in France. 
Especially the Bildungsbiirger developed a growing feeling of belonging to a 
common ethnic group. In these circles regrets could be heard about the political 
situation. I. Gradually, sentiments of this kind got condensed into nationalism. Johann 
Gottlieb Herder developed a philosophy according to which nations, united by language, 
were the subject of history; nations were not aggregates of individuals, but organisms, 
with a soul of their own, and with a defInite life span. II 
It should perhaps be emphasized that the word 'Germany' was imprecisely defmed 
at that time: It could mean the territory of the empire, or, more frequently, the territories 
inhabited by German-speaking people. No one thought of the construction which in 1871 
became the 'unilled' German Reich. 
The group participating in the national discourse was relatively small, in 1770 
perhaps some 20.000. 12 The political signifIcance of this discourse was next to zero. For 
the ruling groups 'Germany' was a sentimental category, but not a political guideline. For 
them German territories were ground for conquests or barter objects, in the same way as 
some parts of Poland or Turkey. The policy of Prussia can illustrate this: In 1740, Prussia 
conquered the rich province ofSilesia (mostly inhabited by Germans). In connection with 
the three partition of Poland (1772-1795) she got a considerable share of Polish territory. 
In 1795 Prussia signed the treaty of Basel with revolutionary France. Secretly she 
accepted that France could annex the whole German territory on the left bank of the 
Rhine, in exchange for French support for compensations elsewhere, which she got in 
1803. 
3. The Effects of the Napoleonic Conquest 
In 1797 France annexed Belgium and the whole territory to the left of the Rhine. France 
accepted in tum that the worldly German princes could get compensations, mostly at the 
expense of ecclesiastical territory \vithin the Empire. This was realized with the so-called 
Reichsdeplitaflonshallpischiuss in 1803. Practically all the ecclesiastical territories with 
3.2 mi Ilion inhabitants (one seventh of the population) were handed over to different 
states . The same happened to most of the Free Cities and, in 1805, with the so-called 
Empire knights (Reichsritler), roughly 1500 dwarf states with 350000 inhabitants. In 1807 
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Napoleon extended the French border to the Baltic Sea. 
The German medium-sized states like Bavaria, Wiirttemberg or Baden gained 
considerably in territory, and some of their rulers could from now on call themselves 
'king'. In these medium-sized states Napoleon had very reliable allies. In 1806 he united 
them in the Rhine League and the Holy Roman Empire got formally dissolved. 
After the dissolution of the Empire a reform wave with longlasting effects swept 
through most of the German states. In the medium-sized states like Bavaria the main 
impulse stemmed from the necessity to unite the newly acquired territories with the old 
ones. Often after French model, the judicial system and the state apparatus were 
considerably modernized. In Prussia, after the military disaster of 1806/07, high-ranking 
civil servants and officers initiated an ambitious reform wave: Serfdom was abolished, the 
peasants were legally freed and the principle of freedom of commerce introduced. The 
aim was to strengthen the country by liberal economic reforms, to 'beat Napoleon with the 
help of Adam Smith' . The towns were granted self-government, the army was reformed 
and compulsory military service introduced, the educational system was modernized and 
expanded. !3 
The establishment of French supremacy was registered with apathy by the German 
population at large. But within a few years the hardships of the French occupation created 
a bitter hatred. Nationalism (often not to be distinguished from xenophobia) became a 
political factor, as shown e.g. by the volunteer formations in 1813 . 
The nationalist historiography oflater decades depicted the wars 1813-1815 as a 
gigantic patriotic outburst. But the argument has to be strongly justified: Still in 1812 all 
the German states supported Napoleon's invasion of Russia. When in March 1813 Prussia 
declared war on France, the result was a German civil war: The Rhine League states 
continued to fight on the French side. Bavaria joined Napoleon's opponents in September 
1813. Most of the other Rhine League states did the same some months later - after 
Napoleon's defeat at Leipzig. Saxony remained loyal even then because the French 
emperor had Linked Saxony's King Friedrich August in personal union to the Grand Duke 
of Warsaw. 
During the battle of Leipzig, Saxon army units defected to the anti-Napoleon 
coalition. This was perhaps a sign of German patriotism. But when in 1815 the Saxon 
troops heard that the northern part of Saxony was to be ceded to Prussia according to the 
decisions of the Vienna congress, they broke out in revolt. Many shouted 'Vivat 
Napoleon' or other pro-French slogans, Prussian insignia were tom down, and some units 
discharged their officers. As a reprisal, three Saxon grenadier battalions were disarmed, 
their flags burned, and seven leading rioters shot. \ 4 The loyalty to Saxony was surely 
stronger than the one to a (non-existing) 'Germany'. 
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The existence of 25000 volunteers in Prussia indicates a sense of patriotism 
(presumably more towards Prussia than towards 'Germany'). But among armies mounting 
to hundreds of thousands of people, they were a small factor. Their recruitment was 
socially significantly biased: Pupils, students, highly educated people and town craftsmen 
were strongly overrepresented, but people from the countryside, at that time still three 
quarters of the population, were hardly seen. ll Many Prussian men had to be threatened 
by sanctions before they unenthusiastically fulfi.lIed their compulsary military service, and 
there was considerable avoidance. 16 
Basically, the years 1803-15 saw a complex series of wars and political manoeuvres. 
The main actors on the German side were the ruling groups of the different states, who 
followed state-egotistic lines. The people at large were mostly bystanders. Nationalist 
sentiment was a political factor, but an inferior one, modifying only slightly the course 
of events. 
4. The Peace Order of 1815 and the German League 
At the congress of Vienna the main structure of the peace order after Napoleon was 
decided upon. Matters were solved according to the principle of the balance of power, not 
according to national or cultural principles. Some severe conflicts had to be solved, e.g. 
when in the autumn of 1814 the Russian and the Prussian governments jointly demanded 
that Poland should be incorporated into the Russian Empire, and Saxony into Prussia. The 
other European powers were afraid of Russian dominance and rejected the project. On 3rd 
January 1815, Great Britain, France, and Austria signed a secret military defence alliance, 
which the Netherlands, Bavaria, Hanover and other states shortly afterwards joined. If it 
would have come to war, the front would have run straight across Germany. The conflict 
was solved by the following compromise: The larger part of Poland ('Congress Poland') 
was given to Russia. Prussia acquired the northern half of Saxony and another part of 
Poland (,Grand Duchy Posen ' ).17 
Ideas entertained by some German patriots of a transfer of Alsace-Lorraine from 
France to the German League were no serious issue in Vienna - no one was interested in 
weakening France so much. Out of similar reasons Denmark could keep her position in 
Northern Germany. On the other hand, large territories in western Germany were granted 
to Prussia as a counterweight to France. Prussia came to consist of two separated halves. 
As to the future of Germany, the following considerations were essential: Some form 
of common organization was necessary because an unconnected conglomerate of small 
states would endanger the stability of the whole European balance system. But a close 
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unification of the German-speaking territories would, inter alia, presuppose a division of 
the multinational Austrian Empire and the de facto end for several dozen of ruling 
dynasties. This was not seriously discussed in Vienna. A more realistic alternative was the 
partition of Germany, whereby the north would come under Prussian, the south under 
Austrian domination. Hereby Prussia would gain much more than Austria because the 
Prussian domination over the northern mini-states would be much stronger than the 
Austrian one over medium-sized states like Bavaria. Thus, Austria rejected the idea. 
The solution was a loose federation with some few, weak common institutions, the 
German League (Deutscher Bund), to be jointly dominated by Austria and Prussia; 
Austria was the first-rank power, for instance holding the presidency. It had to be a loose 
federation because a stable Austrian-Prussian block would create a power centre which 
again would endanger European balance. 
The borders of the German League were almost identical to those of the old Empire. 
The,major exception was Belgium, which in 1815 was assigned to the Netherlands. The 
borders were nowhere corrected to make them fit better with cultural cleavages. And, as 
in the old Empire, both Prussia and Austria controlled large areas on the other side of the 
borders.'s 
The European governments agreed upon mutual support against revolutionary 
dangers. This implied military intervention. Additionally, Christianity was proclaimed as 
a binding element and legitimating base for the whole system ('The Holy Alliance'). It 
was presumably this ideological point which introduced a dangerous, and, at the end, 
crippling flaw into the system: The Ottoman Empire was not included. This omission 
created a zone of instability in the East, into which Russia later intruded, thereby 
threatening the British and French position in the Eastern Mediterranean. This led to the 
Crimean War and the collapse of the whole European security system. 
5. The Prussian Bureaucracy and Polish Territories 
Cultural borders did not have a great significance in the eyes of the decision makers, but 
they were not completely irrelevant. To mention one example, the British liberal public 
opinion demanded the reconstruction of Poland, and Lord Castlereagh introduced the 
problem on the agenda of the Vienna negotiations. The Russian-Prussian and Russian--
Austrian treaties, which were incorporated into the Vienna documents, contained an 
article, according to which the Poles should be granted special institutions. In fact, until 
1831, Congress Poland kept a considerable degree of autonomy.l9 
As to Prussian policies towards Poland, a clear evolution is to be noticed. In the 
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eighteenth century, Prussia colIected all kinds of territories, no matter whether they were 
German or Polish. The Prussian bureaucratic apparatus got simply extended to the new 
regions. The incorporation ofSilesia went quite smoothly. The same, although to a lesser 
extent, was true of the regions between Pomerania and Eastern Prussia, which Prussia 
gained in 1772. One reason was the comparative efficiency of the Prussian bureaucracy. 
The populations experienced a more efficient and less arbitrary administration than 
before. Additionally, large sections of the population were German, especialIy in the 
towns. 
But the regions gained in 1793 and 1795 belonged to the core of Poland. Underrating 
the cultural factor, the Prussian government again mechanically extended its institutions 
into the new parts, neglecting traditional Polish structures. Furthermore, psychological 
blunders were made, for instance police regulations were published only in German. 
Dissatisfaction among the Poles became widespread. When in 1806 French troops entered 
these provinces, the Prussian bureaucrats were forcefulIy thrown out. Newly organized 
Polish troops supported Napoleon. 
The Prussian bureaucrats leamed that Polish territories should be handled with care. 
When in 1815 Prussia again gained a large section of Poland (Grand Duchy Posen), King 
Frederick William ill promised a special constitution, respect for the religion, equal use 
of the Polish language in official affairs and equal access for Poles to posts in the 
administration. Indeed, in the first years the Prussian policy was comparatively liberal. 
During the Polish uprising in 1830/ 1831 against Russia, the Prussian provinces 
remained calm, but large sections of the Polish nobility and the clergy had supported the 
uprising in Congress Poland. This led to a systematic shift in Prussian policies: 
germanization, albeit to be practised slowly and with care, became the guide line of 
Prussian policies. 
In 1831, Tsar Nicholas I proposed to Prussia a division of Congress Poland and 
offered territories. Berlin said no.20 This was one of the rare examples when a state said 
no to the possibility of expansion. It was a matter of political calculation. More Polish 
territory would have absorbed much energy and thereby in the end weakened Prussia 
instead of strengthening it. 
Here is the point in time when cultural borders enter into the calculations of political 
decision makers : Experience showed that regions which were culturalIy similar, were 
easier to incorporate. In principle, it was possible to integrate culturally different regions 
successfully. But it took much longer time, much more energy, and it could cause long-
lasting problems. So, if a state could choose the direction of expansion, it was, within the 
expansionistic logic, more appropriate to expand into culturally similar regions. This is 
the key to understand Prussian politics some decades later. 
12 
6. The Zollverein and Economic Unification 
In 1818, as part of the reform wave which started in 1807, Prussia introduced a new 
customs system (slightly to be modified in 1821). Thereby all internal customs barriers 
were abolished and moderate tariffs introduced at the Prussian borders. Import or export 
restrictions were, with some exceptions, abolished, and the import of raw material became 
practically free.21 Protectionists regarded the new tariffs as being too low, and patriots like 
the economist Friedrich List criticized Prussia to erecting new barriers within Germany. 
But the leaders of the Prussian bureaucracy simply followed their own interests, and in 
this perspective the new system was logical: it simplified administration, it eased 
commerce within Prussia, and it fostered the integration between old and new Prussian 
territories. Tariffs were a main source of income for the Prussian state, and therefore they 
had to be at medium level: protectionist levels would strangle cross-border trade and 
thereby reduce income from tariffs to zero; tariff incomes would be zero as well in case 
of free trade. 
Prussia had an interest to enlarge its system in order to build a land bridge between 
its geographically separated halves. The relative magnitude of the Prussian market and the 
importance of Prussian territory for trade routes gave Prussia a strong position at 
negotiations with neighbouring states. And most decisive in the specific situation: A joint 
tariff system could increase state income considerably and cut administration expenses 
drastically, because the borders to be guarded got enormously reduced. 
After a process of complex negotiations, on the 1st January 1834, the Zollverein 
treaties came into force. Thereby Prussia and most of the German states formed a joint 
customs union, in which internal tariffs were abolished and a common tariff established 
at the external border. Austria did not take part; the Austrian leaders regarded the 
economy of their empire as being too inhomogeneous and weak to be opened to 
competition from the outside. Many historians have later regarded the formation of the 
Zollverein under Prussian leadership as the first step towards the kleindeutsche solution 
of the German question, i.e. unification without Austria. It should perhaps be emphasized 
that the founders of the Zollverein didn't act III order to foster German unification. As 
William Oscar Henderson put it: 'The States concerned fought for their own narrow 
interests and many joined the Zollverein only when economic depression and lack of 
public revenue made further resistance to Prussia impossible' ." 
As a device to increase public revenue the Zollverein was plainly a success. But as 
a means to faster economic progress in general or to German unity, its importance has 
often been exaggerated. Following the terminology introduced by Jacob Viner, the 
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immediate effects of a customs union can be classified as 'trade creation' and 'trade 
diversion' : the abolishing of the tariffs inside the union creates trade and thus has a 
positive effect on specialization and economic growth. On the other hand, tariffs at the 
border impede trade. The net effect of a customs union is the combined result of those 
positive and negative effects. In general, studies show that the growth effect of a customs 
union (including the EEC) is vel)' limited. As to the Zollverein, the total income growth 
effect did not exceed one percent. 23 
The Zollverein had perhaps a positive effect on the building of the German railways, 
and thereby upon growth and economic integration, but the connection between railways 
and Zollverein is difficult to assess. Unless more sophisticated studies are available, it is 
most reasonable to estimate the stimulus to railway building as being of the same 
magnitude as the stimulus to trade in general because railway building is mostly a function 
of trade expectations. 
The practical problems in connection with collecting and redistributing the tariff 
revenue led to treaties establishing fixed exchange rates for the currencies. This led to two 
separate monetary regions, the Taler in the North and the Gulden in Southern Germany. 
At the end the Taler prevailed. This process of monetaI)' unification surely had positive 
effects on intra-German trade. The Zollverein had eased it, but it is impossible to assess 
how much, and its impact in the end on economic growth in general." In general, the 
economic effects of the Zollverein seem to have been rather modest. 
The negotiations between the Zollverein member states trained the bureaucracies 
involved in jointly handling complex matters. This, together with a tighter economic 
integration, made the administration of the Reich after 1871 much easier. But neither 
economy nor common bureaucratic experience led to the Reich. 
In 1834, large areas of the later German Reich stayed outside the Zollverein. 
Hanover, Oldenburg, and Schaumburg-Lippe joined in 1853 . The town states Hamburg 
and Bremen, ruled by resolute free-traders, did not join until 1888 i.e. after the formation 
of the unified Reich in 1871 (of which Hamburg and Bremen were members right from 
the start). Seen in this perspective, the process of German integration was realized at 
different speeds. 
To maintain her dominant position within the Zollverein, Prussia successfully 
torpedoed all initiatives to include Austria. A brilliant move in this respect was the free-
trade treaty with France in 1862 (and thereby with Great Britain). The Austrian economy 
could not compete successfully on a free trade basis (at least, the Austrian leaders thought 
so), therefore Austria had to give up her last attempt for membership. Prussia thereby 
deliberately maintained high economic barriers between e.g. the industrial regions in 
Saxony and Austrian Bohemia. Politically this made sense, but it was detrimental to 
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economic growth. The forces of production, to use a Marxian term, could not press any 
union between these regions about. And, as shown below, in most of the major political 
issues the medium-sized states, albeit economically closely cooperating with Prussia, 
supported Austria. 
7. German Nationalism and the Abortive Unification from Below 
The decisions of the congress of Vienna were a severe disappointment to German patriots. 
Nationalist enthusiasm turned into political opposition. Unification and constitutional 
rights were the main aims. In the beginning, the authorities had little problems in 
repressing the movement, but for several reasons nationalist and democratic sentiment 
gained momentum: A high demographic pressure and severe economic conditions 
impoverished large sections of the population, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the 
authorities and weakening old ideological concepts; categories like 'nation' could create 
new collective identities and fulfil demands for transcendency. 
German intellectuals were quite busy creating new symbols and evoked especially 
history, the alleged German greatness in medieval times, as a source of common identity. 
Additionally, the number of people being able to read grew from some 15 percent in 1770 
to 40 percent in 1830; thanks to the educational efforts of the state bureaucracies the 
number of potential readers of subversive literature grew considerably.2l And last but not 
least, the demand of state bureaucracies for money kept growing. This meant growing 
taxation, and therefore a growing resistance among the population, if taxation continued 
to be imposed without the people (or at least a part of it) having political representation. 
For a long time princes and bureaucrats tried to avoid political control by the rudimentary 
representative institutions (in e.g. Prussia provincial estate representative assemblies) by 
keeping expenses as low as possible. But in the 1840s, credit-fmanced activities to 
stabilize the food and employment situation were unavoidable26 Credits were only 
available if a tighter parliamentary control over state finances would be accepted. Thus 
the demand for constitutional reforms could not be ignored for ever. 
In March 1848, social desperation and deep-rooted political discontent exploded in 
almost all German capi tals and residences. After violent riots and barricade fighting the 
princes entrusted liberal politicians to form the governments; many, including the king of 
Prussia, promised democratic changes and the incorporation of their states into a German 
nation state. Citizens fo rmed militia units; the colours of democratic unity, black-red-
golden, were seen everywhere. Parliamentary deputies from southern Germany organized 
elections on the basis of universal and equal franchise for men, and, on 18th May 1848 
15 
in Frankfurt the Nationalversammlung started its deliberations. The state governments and 
princes accepted its authority, and, on 28th June 1848 a provisional German government 
was installed; the works for a common German constitution began. 
For at short while it looked as if the Germans could create a united democratic nation 
from below, without guillotines or military dictatorship. This did not happen for a variety 
of reasons: The democratic camp was very heterogeneous, ranging from moderate 
constitutionalists to radical republicans. The spectre of social revolution emerged in 
numerous riots, and better-off citizens began again to support the traditional authorities. 
Additionally, the Nationalversammlung lost a lot of prestige at an early stage when it 
failed to organize massive help for Schleswig-Holstein, being in rebellion against the 
Danish Crown. The Nationalversammlung had no troops and asked Prussia to support the 
Schleswig-Holstein rebellion. The Prussian army did so, a move which in turn induced 
Russia and Great Britain to intervene diplomatically. The intervention mechanism 
established in 1815 still worked and the European powers regarded German unity as 
detrimental to their interests. In order not to risk a war with the great powers, Prussia 
retreated and signed the Malmo armistice. The Nationalversammlung could do nothing 
but endorse it. 
A unification of GeIDlany (understood as the German League or as a linguistic 
entity) would have meant the dissolution of the Austrian empire. The Austrian crown and 
bureaucracy would have been the losers of such a development. In October 1848 they 
ordered loyal troops (mostly Croatians) to storm democratic Vienna; with the assistance 
of Russian troops they could crush the Hungarian rebellion, and with French help the 
uprising in Italy. The alliance between the great state bureaucracies proved to be much 
stronger than the widespread national and democratic sentiment. 
Additionally, the national democrats in Frankfurt were not too consistent in their 
principles: On 28th July 1848 they voted for all Austrian territories within the borders of 
the German League to be incorporated into the new German state - including e.g. the 
Czech areas. Limburg, a Dutch province, was also on the list, as well as the German-
speaking parts of Posen. rI Later, out of political expediency, they restricted the claims to 
the territories of the German League. The Nationalversammlung thereby accepted the 
borders drawn in Vienna in 1815 as the borders of 'Germany', although these borders 
diverged considerably from the borders of the area inhabited by German-speaking people. 
The victory of the Austrian counter-revolution made all these deliberations obsolete. 
As a meagre substitute for the grossdeutsche project, the National Assembly opted for a 
kle indeutsche solution: On 3rd April 1849 a delegation offered the crown of German 
Kaiser to the Prussian King Frederick William IV, to be ruler over a torso-Germany 
without the Austrian territories. The king said no, not wanting to accept a crown from 
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below. 
In April 1849, 28 Gennan states collectively accepted the constitution endorsed by 
the Nalionalversammlung. But the major states were not among them. A second 
movement from below (Reichsverjassungskampagne) tried to force them to accept it. The 
movement gained impressive strength and was victorious in some places (Saxony, Pfalz, 
Baden). The regular army of Baden, volunteers and sections of the Prussian Reserve 
Guard (Landwehr) supported it, but it could not prevail against the loyal (mostly Pruss ian) 
troops. On 23rd July 1849 the fortress Rastatt had to surrender.21 
8. 'Unification' From Above 
The revolution was repressed, but it had left traces. Practically all Gennan states (not yet 
Austria) were constitutional states from now on. The case of Prussia is instructive: on 8th 
November 1848 the Prussian king used troops to dissolve the Prussian National Assembly. 
But then he introduced a constitution from above incorporating essential elements of the 
draft of the dissolved National Assembly. Prussia got a parliament with two chambers, 
one of them (Abgeordnetenhaus) to be elected on the base of universal, but unequal 
franchise, differentiated according to the tax basis (DreikIassen-wahlrecht). The 
parliament had the right of budget controL The Prussian political system was still authori-
tarian, and government, bureaucracy, and army were not under parliamentary control, but 
the system was regulated by constitution and laws. Secondly, in the course of the 
revolution the remaining feudal burdens of the peasants were abolished, a move which 
had a strong pacifying effect on the country-side. Thus, Prussian crown and bureaucracy 
reacted flexibly to the threat from below, never relying on repression only. 
While Prussian troops still were involved in crushing the Reichsverjassungs-
kampagne Prussia tried to engineer a kleindeutsche unification of Gennany from above 
under her leadership. Negotiations with other states ended in a draft common constitution. 
26 Gennan states accepted the programme. The larger ones - Bavaria, Hanover, Saxony, 
Wiirttemberg - did not and fonned instead an alliance on their own (Vierk6nigsbiindnis). 
Another line of division appeared: Small states joined Prussia - large states, having a 
stronger feeling of sovereignty, stood aloof. Also this front line did not coincide with 
membership of the Zollverein. 
In autumn 1850, the Prussian project was stopped by a massive diplomatic 
intervention by Russia and Austria; in the treaty of Olmlitz (29th November 1850) Prussia 
had to retreat. Once again (for the last time) the mechanism of foreign intervention 
worked to prevent a united Gennany. 
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But in 1853 the Crimean War broke out, the international system collapsed, and 
Pruss ian diplomacy got an enormous chance to improve relationships with Russia. In 
1863, the new axis Berlin - St. Petersburg got strengthened by Prussian collaboration to 
crush another Polish uprising. 
The Franco-Sardinian-Austrian War of 1859 worked as catalyst for a revival for 
nationalist agitation. Large sections of the public opinion demanded active participation 
on the Austrian side, and the Austrian government tried to play the patriotic card.29 But 
Berlin followed a cool line of neutrality. Public pressure could not induce Berlin to 
sacrifice own interests for alleged German causes. Austria was beaten, the international 
intervention mechanism, which still in 184811849 rescued her position, did not exist any 
more. France, which in 1848/49 had been Austria's ally in repressing the Italian uprisings, 
now followed an expansionist course. 
In 1864 the parliament in Copenhagen formally incorporated Schleswig into the 
Danish monarchy. This was a breach of the London protocol from 1852 and therefore 
gave Prussia (and Austria) the pretext to conquer Schleswig-Holstein. In contrast to 1848-
1850 Denmark stood alone. Prussia and Austria treated the provinces as annexed terri-
tories, not as liberated German lands. This caused outrage and bitterness among patriots 
in Schleswig-Holstein. But the majority of the population accepted the Prussian conquest 
tacitly. 
The governments in Berlin and Vienna had by now changed their way of treating 
public opinion: Newspapers were not censured or forbidden any more, instead the 
journalists were fed with manipulated information, or bribed. But this does not mean that 
Berlin or Vienna let themselves be impressed by public opinion when vital interests were 
at stake. This became apparent during the Prussian Verjassungskonflikt: The military 
establishment embarked in 1860 on an ambitious reform programme to modernize and 
enlarge the army and to strengthen its political reliabilityJO But the liberal majority of the 
Prussian parliament said no. King William I made Count Otto v. Bismarck, known as die-
hard defender of authoritarian principles, prime minister to execute the programme against 
parliamentary resistance. Bismarck became for a while the most-hated man in Germany. 
His reputation became even worse in 1866, when he escalated up to the point of war the 
conflict with Austria about the future of the German League. J) All major German states, 
from Bavaria over Hanover to Saxony, although being members of the Zollverein together 
with Prussia, supported Austria - a fact seemingly overlooked by those authors who saw 
the Zollverein as the binding element prefiguring united Germany. 
Prussia's military victory reflected the general advanced position she had in building 
up modern social structures. She was much more industrialized than Austria; due to the 
efficient educational systems, the soldiers were, at least against outer enemies, brave and 
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loyal, even the recruits from Polish-speaking areas. Her railway net was dense, allowing 
for the fust precisely planned and rapidly executed railway mobilization in military 
history. 
Austria was forced to leave Germany (now to be understood as German League 
minus Austria) and had to give Venice to Italy, but was otherwise left intact. Prussia 
annexed Schleswig-Holstein and four states (Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, the town 
of Frankfort), thereby uniting the geographically separated halves. The territories north 
of river Main were united into a federation (Northern German League) under Prussian 
dominance. Bismarck accepted a national parliament (Reichstag) elected on the basis of 
universal and equal franchise, and with the right of budget control, thereby supplying the 
otherwise authoritarian political structure with some democratic legitimacy. The princes 
were represented in the second chamber, the Bundesrat, which thus represented both the 
federal and the authoritarian principle. 
Bismarck imposed moderate peace terms on Austria and stopped at the Main because 
he wanted to end the war before any other power (especially France) could intervene. But 
he concluded defence alliances with the four states south of river Main, and economic 
integration was agreed upon. In the course of the reconstruction of the Zollverein, a 
common parliament (Zo/lparlament), composed of the members of the Northern German 
Reichstag and southern delegates, was installed to produce common legislation, with a 
Zollbundesrat as second chamber. StiU, there was no automatic trend towards German 
unity: The elections in the South showed clear majorities against a unification under 
Prussian dominance. The strong anti-Prussian resentment was fed by democratic-liberal, 
Catholic and grossdeutsche sympathies.32 Many of the enemies of Prussian dominance 
expressed hopes that the French army would smash the Northern German League; the 
Guelfs, loyalists to the dethroned king Georg V of Hanover, whose country Prussia had 
annexed, even organized a Guelfic legion (700-1000 men) to fight side by side with the 
French army.33 The process of further unification, except in economic matters, seemed to 
have come to a standstill. 
French policy changed everything. On 19th July 1870, France declared war on 
Prussia. The French declaration of war caused a nationalist outburst throughout Germany, 
of an intensity never experienced before. This radically weakened the political anti-
Prussian base in Southern Germany. Although most of the leading figures of the South 
disliked it, they felt that they were forced to accept Bismarck's offer to join the Northern 
German League, which then was transformed into the German Reich. 
The threat of a French invasion has since Napoleon been a German nightmare, 
particularly in 1840 (when French press and diplomacy demanded the border moved to 
the Rhine), and in 1859. The French declaration of war, intending to impede German 
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unification, placed the security problem on top of the agenda, especially for the weaker 
Southern Germany, and thereby provoked a political unification, which otherwise perhaps 
never would have come. 
9. Conclusions and Comparisons 
The Reich of 1871 contained only a fraction of the area inhabited by German-speaking 
people. Austria was left out, and in this respect the years 1866-1871 can be described as 
the final division of Germany as well. After 1871 grossdeutsche dreams in both Germany 
and Austria still existed, but they did not become operational (apart from furnishing 
Bismarck with another card to play in case Austrian diplomacy should join Germany's 
enemies).34 The question remained latent unti11918, when the Austrian Empire finally 
collapsed. The Austrian National Assembly voted in December 1918 unanimously for 
unification with Germany. This was forbidden by the Allied powers. The Austrian Hitler 
realized the unification in 1938, using his methods. It was only after 1945 that most of the 
Austrians insisted on having a distinctive national identity. 
On the other hand, the Reich of 1871 contained large territories with a non-German 
population: Poles in Posen, Mazurians in East Prussia, Danes in Northern Schleswig, 
French in Lorraine. In short, the German Reich was a political construction which united 
the majority of the Germans, but whose borders ran across all previous definitions of 
Germany. It took a process of many decades before the conception of Germany got 
adapted to the political construction of the new state. 
The inferior position of the national minorities led to bitter strife throughout the 
history of the Reich. But at the referenda in 1920, the majority of the Slavonic Mazurians 
in East Prussia, one third of the Poles in Upper Silesia, and the vast majority of the in-
habitants of e.g. Flensburg town (clearly Danish in 1864) voted for Germany. Thus, the 
German nation, understood as a unit of collective identity, had clearly expanded, 
presumably mostly due to the educational system, and fitted the geographical borders 
better at the end of the Kaiserreich than in 1871. This can be interpreted as a case, where 
the cultural system gradually adapts to the political system. But at the same time, at least 
during World War I, German politics was dominated by a massive expansionist ideology. 
In case of a German victory, the borders of the political system would have been 
expanded enormously3' 
The authoritarian structure of Prussia and the Reich was in conflict with the attitude 
of the population at large, as shown by all the elections in 1848 and from 1867 onwards. 
If we group liberals (greatest party in 1871), socialists and a large part of the Catholic 
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Zentrom Party together under the heading 'democrats ' , then these held constantly a vast 
majority. This forms an interesting contrast to France. In December 1848, 75 percent 
voted for Louis Napoleon as president, and in December 1851 a vast majority of the 
population endorsed his coup d'etat and self-promotion to Emperor Napoleon ill. And in 
1871, the elections to the National Assembly showed again a strong majority for 
monarchist parties. To put it simply: In 1871 most Germans were democrats, but had to 
live under an authoritarian political system; the Frenchmen had in 1848 and 1871 
democratic systems (due to the strength of the democrats concentrated in Paris), but 
sympathized with authoritarian monarchies. After a while, the Frenchmen turned 
democrats as well, the political culture became synchronized to the political system. But 
political systems can show a gigantic inertia. In Germany, in spite of'parliamentarian 
tendencies, the authoritarian structure of the Kaiserreich remained basically intact until 
1918. It needed the shock of the defeat in World War Ito make it crumble - as the French 
defeat in 1870 was needed to make the regime of Napoleon ill crumble. 
In the time span between 1771 and 1871 the feeling of a collective German identity 
had grown from a current among intellectuals to a mass phenomenon. But it was still a 
'soft' factor. When power interests of state bureaucracies collided with national sentiment, 
it was always the sentiment which had to give way. The case of Austria shows this most 
clearly. And national sentiment was strongest when there was an external enemy. National 
sentiment was a 'negative' factor, working against external forces, but hardly able to 
create anything constructive internally. 
The connection between the political system and the economy is perhaps even more 
complex. On some fields strong pressures from the economy on the political system can 
be discerned. In a world characterized by state rivalry, survival depended to a large extent 
on military strength, which in turn depended on economic growth. Liberal internal reforms 
such as the Prussian in 1807 supported economic growth. A policy of status status quo 
retarded economic growth and weakened political power. The changing balance between 
Prussia and Austria from 1815 to 1866 illustrated this point. 
Economic growth meant permanent social change and thereby permanent pressure 
on traditional cultural values and patterns oflegitimation. Economic failure could become 
an enormously dangerous source of political instability, as the riots prior to the 1848 
revolution demonstrated. For the sake of their political survival, internally as well as 
externally, state bureaucracies had to devote a large section of their energies to the 
economy and adapt their policy accordingly. 
Economic growth gave ri se to new classes, such as the industrial bourgeoisie and the 
working class, and thereby changed the social and political balance within the states. 
Because of the growing demand for money, the state bureaucracy had to raise taxes and 
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take up loans. This was only possible if the state apparatus accepted control of its 
financial transactions and tax revenues by representative assemblies. Therefore, absolute 
monarchies were in the long run incompatible with economic growth. 
In the case of Germany, the abolishment of numerous internal trade bruners were 
imperative for economic stabilization. In this respect, and in this respect only, the 
economic system pointed towards unification. But the Zollverein was no necessity. A 
more free-trade oriented policy would presumably have produced better economic 
results.36 The second best solution was chosen because it suited the interests of the state 
bureaucracies better than free-trade. The Zollverein was not intended as a step to political 
unity, and it never created an interest pattern tight enough to enforce unity. Nor showed 
events in 1848 that the Zollverein had shaped perceptions of Germany significantly. The 
German public and the Nalionalversamm/ung thought in grossdeutschen categories 
including Austria. Only after 1871 the Zollverein became a 'unifier': It gave the patina of 
tradition to Prussian policies, 'proving' that Prussia had had a long mission as unifier of 
Germany. 
The most important actors were the state bureaucracies. Of course, they had to take 
mass sentiments into consideration (as a minor factor), and they had to formulate an 
internal policy that stimulated economic growth, even if this meant the abolishment of 
some privileges. In the course of time they had to accept that representative bodies looked 
over their shoulders and they had permanently to work to stabilize their legitimation. 
Strong educational activities were an instrument to foster both legitimation, internal 
homogeneity and economic growth. In particular the Prussian bureaucracy used this 
instrument. The development of a legal system, with independent courts, strengthened 
both the continuity, functionality, and legitimation of bureaucratic power. 
The state bureaucracies could not act arbitrari1y. But it was mostly up to them to act. 
They were stable organizations with accumulated expertise, and they controlled the means 
of power such as the army. 
State bureaucracies, in the time period considered here, tried, if possible, to expand. 
The international system established in 1815 had a moderating effect in this respect, but 
it did not abolish expansionism. France expanded into Algeria in 1830; Russia expanded 
into the area of the Ottoman Empire. Prussia concentrated mostly on Germany. German 
territory was much easier to integrate. Here, in making conquest easier, the cultural sphere 
and, the common German identity, became a political factor. 
But many German states were stable units with collective identities of their own. 
Prussia could annex some of them in 1866 , but they did not crumble by themselves as 
their Italian counterparts in 1860. In 186711870 the remaining German states accepted 
Prussian dominance, but the bureaucracies of the German states kept most of their 
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functions. So Germany turned into a federation, not a centralistic unitary state after the 
French model. 
The case of Italy was different. Culturally, Italy was much less integrated than 
Germany. Most Italian dialects were not intercornrnunicative, and in 1860 only about 2.5 
percent of the population mastered Tuscan, the Italian standard language." The general 
standard of education was in a lamentable stage, worst in the Papal State.3a Social 
conditions were often abhorrent, and most of the Italian states were extremely weak. In 
1848-49 they survived only because Austrian and French troops stabilized them by force. 
After her defeat in 1859, Austria could not stabilize the Italian states any more. National 
agitation and social unrest exploded, and most of them simply crumbled. In Southern Italy 
only a small additional shock from the outside (Garibaldi's march) was enough to produce 
the same effect. Only the Pope 's control over Rome was saved by French troops until 
1870. The violent social rebellion made the better-off classes looking for a new source of 
stability. In this constellation the state of Sardinia-Piedmont could simply annex the other 
states. No foreign power impeded that. On the contrary, Britain actively supported the 
process in order to create a counterbalance to France and Austria. The Piedmontese state 
apparatus was extended over the whole country. Italy became a politically enormously 
centralized state with a culturally very inhomogeneous population. In comparison, the 
population of the German Reich was culturally much more homogeneous, but the political 
structure was a federation with large policy fields to be handled by the regional units. 
In Italy and in Germany a strong conquering state was necessary to create unity. This 
was lacking in Scandinavia. Scandinavianism in the 19th century, as a cultural intellectual 
movement, was perhaps comparable to German or Italian nationalism.39 But there was no 
powerful expansionist state using this ideology as cover for conquest. So, it remained a 
harmless intellectual mode. 
If we lift the discussion to a more abstract level, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: The interdependence and interaction between the cultural, the political, and the 
economic system is complex, and various ways of mutual influence can be discerned. But 
there seems to be no congruence, at least not in the case studied here, between the spheres 
in the sense that politics, economics and culture form a harmonious entity, as some 
structuralist theorists claim. Some structuralist analysts use the model of 'time lag ': The 
different spheres of society move towards congruity, towards an equilibrium, but since 
changes take time, at a given date there is disequilibrium, at least temporarily. Such time 
lags and such moves towards congruence could be observed in this case. But events 
showed as well massive disturbances of any congruence between e.g. culture and politics, 
due to the power interests of ruling bureaucracies. The principles 'balance of power' or 
'expansionism' created time and again facts and solutions which were strongly at variance 
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with any equilibrillln between culture, economy, and politics . Not the move towards 
equilibrium, but the disturbance of equilibria, dictated by power interests seems to be the 
general trait of the development studied here. 
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